The Moroccan nation confronted the French Berber policy well before fighting the decree of May 16, 1930 and those who initiated it.

(This report destined to the press of the Middle East was drafted on May 16, 1933 the date of the third anniversary of the promulgation of the Berber Decree.)

Abdellatif Sbihi, the first nationalist who uncovered the contents of the May 16, 1930 decree, well before its official publication.

The Berber ploy could be considered one of the most insidious colonialist schemes ever known throughout human history due to the manner in which the powerful impose their aims for political division on the weak. Despite this danger, a segment of the French people thought that the endeavor was not only viable but that it could be put into practice with great ease. During the course of meetings on the adoption of this policy and its fulfillment by the Decree of May 16, members of the country's colonial administration believed that Moroccans would neither pay attention to their maneuvers nor be suspicious of their true intentions. And this was despite their knowledge that some Moroccans may have become aware of past undertakings and studies including one whose primary objective was the (potential) eradication of Islam in our country.

The decree was developed in a quasi-urgent manner, even though a majority of French officials including lawyers and its most avid supporters had studied it for months prior to its release. There was not much fanfare after it was released. The Sultan went on a visit to France while the French Resident General opted to attend the session of the North African Congress in Algeria. The local French press was content to mention a few words as if the release of the decree had been expected for months and certain (colonial) newspapers praised the Resident General for the steps undertaken to break new ground.

But contrary to what the French imagined, the issue was not taken lightly by the Moroccan nationalists. The latter had sufficiently debated the policies adopted by the colonial powers and had examined to the minutest details how to combat them. All that was written (by the French) about the Berbers and their future was carefully analyzed. Even so no nationalist had imagined that the issue would take on an official proselytizing character drawing energy from the material and moral support of the Rabat Catholic Church.

It was only after the release of the decree that Moroccan patriots fully awoke to the danger threatening the country in its entirety. They held numerous meetings to develop a consensus on how to respond. The decision to oppose the Berber policy was unanimous. They regarded the policy as a veritable affront to the Moroccan nation and a most harmful attack on its dignity. They began by explaining to the popular masses that the objectives and true intentions of the colonial administration were to (ultimately) divide the country to better allow the French authority to have free reign.

The Moroccan townfolk reacted with massive protests against the decree and voiced their support for the nationalist instigators who had informed them. This reaction was due in part to the mistrust they always had with respect to the colonial authority which was now further reinforced by its Berber policy. But it was also due to their precarious, if not miserable, state of their daily lives and to the stifling lack of freedoms.

The protest movement began in Salé, then Rabat and Fez before expanding to other cities. Chaos spread through most of the municipalities. Patriots who took part in the demonstrations were piled into prisons. The movement leaders were sentenced and exiled but this only heightened the patriotic fervor and sharpened the patriots will to resist. It reinforced their conviction that victory for their cause was within reach.

In the Middle East news of the Berber issue spread widely and the Arab nations protested vigorously against France and its intentions. The King returned urgently from his trip to France. Several days later, he was followed by the French Resident General who spoke to the press expressing his regrets about the events which took place in Morocco. He tried to bring calm to the disorder with very supple but empty rhetoric.

Later, the colonial administation pressured the Sultan to deliver a declaration to be read in his name in the mosques. This speech contained (veiled) threats against the initiators of the movement, denied the allegations the latter had circulated and tried to reach out to the population by giving the Berber tribes (ostensibly) the freedom to choose between customary law or Islamic law. This declaration received rejections and protests from all social classes and even roused the public sentiment and commitment to make the Berber crisis a national cause.

The Sultan's message could effectively be considered a formal act of recognition by the nation's highest authorities of the protest movement. The colonial administration had suffered a bitter setback and realized that to undo the harm it caused it had no choice other than to enter into negotiations to placate the views of the people. Thus a change in their attitude was noted towards those it had labelled, using their own words, as "children who have yet to reach puberty" and now invited them to the negotiating table.

The delegation from Fez was established by popular vote. The other Moroccan cities designated their delegates who were called upon to present petitions to the Sultan. The latter made known to the delegates at an official reception that he supported the requests presented to him. He then ordered his Grand Vizier to inform the delegates in writing that their requests were accepted.

The former Minister of Justice who presided over the delegation requested that those who were exiled as well as other political detainees imprisoned to be liberated per item 13 on the list of petitions.This item demanded that all those exiled and detainees who had participated in the protest movement against the Berber Decree be given general amnesty. It also demanded that the authorities cease any hostile acts against those who had taken (public) positions in that matter. The news of the acceptance of the petitions spread like lightning across the nation. People exchanged the warmest of congratulations following this victory.

For its part, the Protectorate Administration reluctantly informed the president of the delegation of their official acceptance of the petition. Their immediate cares were solely to calm the rebellious mood and to avoid any upswing leading to more trouble. Meanwhile they conveyed implicitly to the Fez delegation an order to leave the capital immediately and to head back to Fez. This order provoked (at first) shock and (then) a furious reaction which culminated in a nationwide strike. In particular the strike in Fez lasted for over four days. In the span of one day, two hundred patriots were imprisoned and fifteen members of the movement leadership were exiled.

The detainees were subsequently freed after serving a full month in prison. During their detention period, the President of the Republic of France visited Morocco and delivered multiple mollifying speeches with plenty of promises ... which fooled no one. He declared most notably, in the name of the Republic of France, that his nation had no intention to harm Morocco or compromise its Islamic legitimacy nor to infringe upon the legitimate power of the Sultan. This type of speech which we know only too well, represented for us nothing more than a token piece of paper or nothing more than a vibration of sound transmitted by waves.

From that moment on, the struggle against the Berber policy entered a decisive stage. Leaflets were distributed at every opportunity to denounce the monstrous aims of the policies of the colonialists. Having failed to identify the principle instigators of the movement, the protectorate government was obliged to enter into negotiations with Abdellatif Sbihi, the leader in exile who instigated the protests. Abdellatif Sbihi. They informed him of their intentions to make amendments to the decree and authorized him to visit with other exiled patriots to convey new perspectives that were being opened with respect to the Berber policy.

Abdellatif Sbihi was thus able to contact other exiled leaders and able to reach agreement with them on a course of action in light of the new direction of the French policy announced by their government. Afterwards he met and informed members of the government in Rabat of his discussions with the exiled leaders. Upon the conclusion of this briefing, he delivered to a French press agency the contents of the accord reached with the protectorate authorities emphasizing the huge success won by the Moroccan nation in its campaign and struggle to reach this accord. The representatives of the colonial authority did not welcome the disclosure of the terms of the accord. They immediately returned their intermediary to his exile and informed him that all that had been negotiated was (rescinded and) now subject to further review.

The Moroccan and Protectorate governments continued their talks on this affair. The Sultan never ceased to demand that the text of the decree be amended but received only non-committal responses after numerous long delays. This lasted until May 16, 1932 a date which the nation (lost patience and) was ready to rise up to express their indignation and revulsion against the continuance of the Berber policy. Leaflets were distributed everywhere. The situation was about to degenerate like that of the first day the decree released in 1930. The public authorities remained silent and made no arrests as if nothing was happening. Meanwhile the people continued to protest and to demonstrate their approbation. Two years following the events of 1930 the government proceeded to liberate political detainees. It again promised to review the controversial articles of the decree and bring to bear the appropriate modifications.

Now that the colonial administration acknowledged the need to amend the May 16 Decree to satisfy the nation's will, we must ask ourselves: Will the colonial authority alter from top to bottom the content of the decree to effectively conform to the wishes of the Moroccan people? Or will our nation simply approve some changes to the basic text and be content despite all its struggles and campaigns against the Berber policy? Will the authorities in our country be persuaded by superficial changes, knowing that their Berber policy would continue to be the cornerstone of the colonial system and the issue to remain only as a focal point of endless research and studies?^[17]

The French government for a variety of reasons is proceeding with a replacement of their Resident General in Rabat. But is this a sign of a reversal of their Berber policy conducted with beating drums these last two years? In fact, we are less interested in modifications to the May 16 Decree as we are to the definitive abolition of their Berber policy. The entire world understands that the Moroccan nation's struggles are not confined to tailor made agreements between particular individuals but are for the total eradication of an extremely dangerous concept. It intends to persevere in the struggle until appropriate laws and justice are reestablished in this country. Irrespective of any change in personnel within the colonial administration or whether the decree is amended or repealed, it will remain committed to its principles as long as the serious and dangerous Berber policy continues to roam in the minds of the French.

That is our position which we declare openly. Our hope is that the French authorities, the real holders of power in our nation, are aware and act with resolve and firmness to put an end to this quarrel born from the Berber ploy. Otherwise it will last as long as it continues to sprout in their minds and create a senseless feeding of fanciful fantasies. Equally we want them to review with the utmost care and seriousness the French policies in Morocco including prospects (and need) for an appropriate change in their direction. This should not be lost on the forewarned.

It is very likely that France has something else to offer than what we have been accustomed to. Perhaps it intends to open an era of dialogue based on a better understanding of Moroccan intentions. Certainly we will continue to cast doubts about the intentions of the French party and to consider their promises as (potential) lures to sap our moral. But it could also be that, overnight, a new policy advocated by France reveals clearly and distinctively its true face and we would find ourselves in front of a view other than that of their Berber policy which we are fighting today with all our might.

During this critical periiod, it is our duty to carefully analyze the policies adopted by the colonial administration keeping in mind that the aim of their Berber policy is to take over Morocco by putting an end to its character and unity from an international perspective. Even more worrisome is if the Berber crisis goes beyond proselytizing towards other aims which we choose not to name until the direction the new Resident General intends to take is understood. Many ot the French, aware of the age we live in, fully grasp the danger they could run into by playing with people's religion and their beliefs. They have begun to distance themselves from such colonial policies. But does this mean that they have totally removed themselves from the major objective of the Berber ploy? No! Of course not!

These questions merit further review; I submit themto all our friends within the ranks of the National Movement who wage for our cause. We hope that the Arab and Islamic nation will continue to support us in our struggle as they have done with their strenuous protests raised against proselytizing, the root of the Berber ploy. A ploy whose different manifestations and multiple facets we have just begun to perceive. The Lord is guarantor of our success.

Marrakesh -- A Moslem Berber^[18].